The great majority of proponents of the developmental state see few negative implications in recent globalisation trends. Globalisation in general is often held to be exaggerated and it may actually increase the possible gains from state activism. The East Asian crisis is largely seen as a temporary aberration. This paper argues that the implications of these trends are more profound. It argues that globalisation processes have acted to reduce the efficacy of policy instruments traditionally used by developmental states. Key problems arise from the theory of the developmental state. Whilst strong country case study work has been produced, few more general principles have been drawn from this and those that have been can be challenged. The arguments for the continued viability of the developmental state often conflate positive and normative elements.
What's Left of 'State Capacity'? The Developmental State After Globalisation and the East Asian Crisis
For proponents of the developmental state both the trends towards greater international economic integration -globalisation, in other words -and the 1997 East Asian currency crises that hit many of the archetypal developmental states have few negative implications for their prescriptions. The problems that developmental states were designed to solve remain; if anything globalisation actually increases the potential for effective intervention. Views that see the East Asian currency crises as caused by state intervention are typically dismissed as superficial, even ideologically motivated by a faith in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism.
In this paper I argue that globalisation trends and the East Asian currency crisis have much more profound implications for the developmental state than its proponents allow. In particular, this paper makes the following arguments:
• Globalisation -both through economic activity and formal changes in international economic law -has seriously undermined the ability of states to use the tools of state intervention that developmental states have relied upon.
• Proponents of the developmental state conflate one argument -that globalisation trends do not reduce the market failures the developmental state is designed to solve and may even accentuate them -with a different argument, namely that developmental states retain the capacity to make such intervention.
• The East Asian currency crises may well not have been caused by state intervention. Nevertheless, the crises and their aftermath illustrate some serious problems in their political economy. In particular, clientalism and corruption were much more prevalent than developmental state theorists had claimed.
• The account of state capacity that was central to the political economy analysis of the developmental state remains quite weak theoretically and is, in terms of the previous point, at some variance with the facts of the key developmental states.
A note of clarification may be necessary at the outset. Although this paper makes a number of criticisms of the practice of developmental states, this should not be taken as denying their key role in their economies' development. This is not intended as an argument against state intervention per se, or an argument that liberalisation along 'Anglo-Saxon' lines is the appropriate policy response. A difficulty here is that much of the literature on the developmental state sees the need to deny almost any criticism of their practice: noting failures of the developmental state is seen as tantamount to adopting a neo-liberal approach and denying the effectiveness of those states; noting significant levels of corruption is seen as accepting a lazy characterisation of 'crony capitalism'. A sophisticated understanding and defence of the developmental state should accept its failings as well as highlighting its achievements.
One significant omission should also be noted, that of labour. When the East Asian countries were held up as shining examples of free trade virtues, radical critics noted these states roles in suppressing labour movements. The developmental state approach, with its nationalist understanding of these states, 1 has tended to underplay these functions noting little more than relatively egalitarian income distributions and rising wages (but see Deyo, 1989) . This matters because of what industrial policy does. It is not simply the role the developmental state plays in controlling labour movements or that it directs its efforts towards industrial policy rather than welfare policy. Industrial policy has variously entailed raising consumer prices through protection, tax breaks, subsidies, business support and preferential credit. In the short run such measures reduce the income of ordinary citizens; as such, there is nothing intrinsically progressive about them.
2 They can be justified on equity, as well as efficiency, grounds if -and only if -dynamically they raise basic income levels over time above the levels they would otherwise have been.
What do -or did -Developmental States do?
Accounts of the practice of the developmental vary between authors, but this is usually a matter of emphasis rather than fundamental differences. Alice Amsden's account would command reasonable assent: 'The developmental state was predicated on performing four functions: developmental banking; local-content management; "selective seclusion" (opening some markets to foreign transactions and keeping others closed); and national firm formation.' (Amsden, 2001, p. 125) . Overlaying this was the monitoring and control apparatus of the developmental state: 'A control mechanism involves a sensor, to detect the "givens" in the process to be controlled; an assessor, to compare what is happening with what should happen; an effector, to change behaviour; and a communications network, to transmit information between all functions…. "The rest" [non-Western countries that have achieved industrialisation] rose, therefore, in conjunction with "getting the control mechanism right" rather than "getting the prices right"' (Amsden, 2001, pp. 9 & 11, emphases in original) .
This account is well known. States directed credit towards specific sectors, even specific firms, identified as being leading-edge; this was done through state-owned banks and/or via subsidies and tax breaks. These policies aimed to develop domestic industry through linkages, enhance domestic technological capability and promote the 1 By nationalist I mean both a focus on the nation state as unit of analysis and a downplaying of internal conflict. There are different approaches to the latter point. In some accounts social conflict is seen as essentially avoidable and negative, resulting from Prisoner's Dilemma type problems and solvable through appropriate institutions. In other accounts potential conflict is acknowledged but accounts point to relatively egalitarian income distribution and ethnic homogeneity as limiting conflict. The degree of equality in some of these economies may have been overstated: Auty (1997) reports Gini coefficients for Korea that are not particularly low, although those for Taiwan are. Nor are other East Asian countries especially egalitarian (You, 1998) . 2 This follows from the nationalist perspective. For example, Amsden (2001) characterises developing countries as facing the choice between an industry-promoting developmental strategy or devaluing the currency which works by reducing real wages (and agricultural incomes). Describing devaluation as a development strategy is questionable economics anyway. However, the point Amsden misses is that the industry promotion measures also reduce real wages. For progressive critiques of the developmental state see and Kitching (2001) . export industries of the future. Foreign trade, and still more foreign direct investment and finance, was only liberalised gradually with deliberate use of trade policy to promote domestic industry. Entry by foreign MNCs was only permitted selectively and hedged by domestic content requirements and similar measures in order to promote domestic firm development and technological capacity. Intervention here was often not just at the industry level, but also at the level of specific firms; some were demonstration firms established under public ownership and then privatised (a policy historically from Japan and adopted by Taiwan amongst others). The crucial nature of the state here was to co-ordinate activity in an economy in such a manner as to solve certain key market failures in the developmental process. Co-ordination of investment effort amongst firms was crucial given the interdependence of profitability of any one firm's investment on the activities of others. Performance requirements were placed on firms. Up-grading of production and entering new industries entailed major risks for firms and the socialisation of those risks by the state was crucial in promoting structural change.
Of course such policies were common amongst developing countries in the post-war period until the liberalisations of the 1980s and 1990s. But how were the developmental states able to achieve successful growth and industrial change, when similar policies were tried elsewhere with disappointing, even disastrous, results? In the classic cases of Korea and Taiwan support for domestic firms was tied to rigorously enforced performance criteria, particularly achieving export targets (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990) . The key was not just the policy tools chosen in this account: the successful developmental state has 'embedded autonomy' (Evans, 1995) , an effective bureaucracy relatively autonomous from political processes and interest groups so that it is able to formulate and implement policy independently, but one also sufficiently enmeshed with business that its policies command legitimacy and are responsive to their needs. Whilst developmental states may need autonomy to formulate and implement policy, they also need to be able to co-operate and communicate with the private sector to acquire relevant information and achieve public-private co-ordination. It was this 'state capacity' that allowed developmental states to implement these policies successfully. Leftwich (1995, p. 405) identifies six key features of the developmental state: 'a determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy; a weak and subordinated civil society; the effective management of non-state economic interests; and repression, legitimacy and performance'. Developmental states, in this analysis, were established before a powerful capitalist class had emerged and without the existence of a powerful landed class; this latter point is seen as a key difference between the East Asian developmental states and Latin American countries (cf. Pempel, 1999) . Others, as we discuss below, conceive state-society power relations in less zero-sum terms (notably Weiss, 1998) . There are divergent views over which countries may legitimately be characterised as developmental states. Weiss (1998; effectively wishes to confine the term to Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Others would, variously, include Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, plus Brazil and Mexico. Amsden (2001) throws the net wider still and also includes Argentina, Chile, China, India and Turkey. This is more important than a quibbling disagreement between authors. To raise a recurrent theme of this paper, it reflects whether successful developmental states are to be explained on a case-by-case basis by a complex configuration of circumstances with, consequently, few more general lessons; or, is there a more general continuum of developmental states with variations in the degree to which countries possess the characteristics of the ideal developmental determining (at least once other factors are controlled for) their economic success.
For Peter Evans, and other developmental state theorists, 'state involvement is a given. The appropriate question is not "how much" but "what kind"' (Evans, 1995, p. 10) . Thus the nature of intervention in the developmental state is key. I argue that it is only reasonable to understand them as developmental states if they are understood to pursue a thorough-going industrial policy defined as: a policy aimed at particular industries (and firms as their components) to achieve outcomes that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole….
[With] the state selectively monitoring entry, establishing mechanisms to make possible more ex ante coordination than is possible through market mechanisms alone, and for government regulation or overview to constrain or supplement profit incentives (Chang, 1994, pp. 60-1, emphases in original) Here Chang particularly identifies investment co-ordination and negotiated exit and scrapping of surplus capacity as key areas where the state can play a positive role through industrial policy. Below the paper examines how these policies were applied, before questioning whether they are operable given globalisation trends. The paper then goes on to examine how much mileage the concept of 'state capacity' has, particularly in the light of the East Asian currency crisis.
Developmental Banking
Skocpol sees finance as central to the developmental state: 'a state's means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us more than could any other single factor about its existing (and its immediately potential) capacities to create or strengthen state organizations, to employ personnel, to co-opt political support, to subsidize economic enterprises and to fund social programs.' Similarly, Amsden (2001, ch. 6 ) sees developmental banking institutions as having played a key role both in directing finance and monitoring performance. Developmental financial institutions play a key role both in providing investment funds when retained profits are likely to be insufficient, and in channelling funds towards priority areas. Allied to this is the nature of corporate governance: with concentrated share ownership, particularly with family-owned firms, companies do not face the short-term pressures to maximise shareholder value that are often claimed to operate in economies with Anglo-Saxon financial systems (Singh, 1998) .
The classic argument of Amsden (2001) and others runs along the following lines. States direct finance through publicly-owned banks and/or systems of allowances towards the sectors they have ear-marked for expansion. Firms want the rents that accrue from this subsidised finance and hence there will be excess demand for it. States are able to monitor firms to ensure they do invest in line with developmental through enforcing performance standards; firms will aim to meet these as they wish to retain access to preferential finance. Over time developmental banks may develop similar close monitoring relationships with creditor firms that have been observed in the German and Japanese banking systems. Moreover, since these systems tend to transfer risks from macroeconomic fluctuations to the lenders -whereas Anglo-Saxon systems tend to concentrate these risks on the borrowers (Allen and Gale, 2000) -this can crucially help to socialise the risks of investment in new areas.
Textbook orthodox economics analysis views state-directed developmental finance systems as leading to inefficient 'financial repression': low (sometimes negative) real interest rates limit the supply of savings whilst there is excess demand inefficiently allocated by bureaucrats and open to rent-seeking and corrupt relationships. Nevertheless, developmental finance systems do appear to have their own logic as outlined above, provided monitoring is properly applied (e.g. Wade and Veneroso, 1998) . The elasticity of savings with respect to the interest rate is typically over-stated in financial repression accounts and proper monitoring should ensure adequate returns. Provided that the financial restraint does not go to excessive repressive levels -with, notably, strongly negative interest rates -the system can be effective in encouraging capital accumulation.
How far this model fits developmental state reality varies. The account fits Korea before the 1990s and Brazil economic miracle years (c.1964-73) particularly. Malaysia and Thailand had a less thorough-going industrial policy and relied more on tax allowances than directed credit. Thailand had a relatively liberal financial system (Doner and Unger, 1993) . With Malaysia it had a weaker monitoring regime than Korea 3 and policy that created rent-seeking opportunities for favoured ethnic groups (Fay and Jomo, 2000; Rasiah and Shari, 2001) . Even Taiwan, with public banks dominating finance until the 1990s, specific state direction of finance remained limited, the public banks were risk-averse and did not develop close monitoring relationships with their clients (Cheng, 1993; Fields, 1995, chs 3 & 5) .
If this system was so effective, why was it liberalised in the 1990s? Some of the impetus came from external pressure and the desire to attract funds from abroad, but there were key internal pressures. As its proponents concede one problem with developmental banking is a tendency for over-expansion and indebtedness (Amsden, 2001) . Not only are there strong incentives for firms to build up debt, but this can act to weaken discipline functions of the banks. In the Korean case impetus came both from the monetary authorities who found the system created difficulties with operating stabilisation policies -high levels of corporate indebtedness, much of it short-term debt -limited the scope for using interest rates as a policy tool. Big business welcomed the chance to escape from government control and, through shareholdings, exert control over the financial system (Choi, 1993) . This should raise questions -considered in more detail later -as to whether the state-business relationship was quite the synergy the developmental state account claims. High levels of corporate indebtedness persisted in Korea into the 1990s until the crisis, but with Taiwan risk-averse lending and more cautious liberalisation led to debt-equity levels similar to countries like the United Kingdom (Nam et al, 2000) .
It is a standard result from welfare economics that in the presence of multiple distortions liberalising one market will not necessarily raise welfare. This has particular resonance with the experience of developmental states in liberalising their financial systems during the 1990s. Financial liberalisation in the absence of adequate prudential regulation can lead to wide cycles of lending with excessive expansion leading to heavy retrenchment when bad loans become evident, associated swings in interest rates and lending for speculation. These trends were evident in emerging markets even before the 1997 East Asian crisis and subsequent currency crises elsewhere (Grabel, 1995) . Nevertheless, to anticipate a point below, it is difficult to see how developmental states can now return to these finance systems.
Selective Seclusion
Several recurrent themes from the developmental state literature recur under this heading. The two main issues are over trade and technology policy.
On trade policy, a key claim is that developmental states have eschewed static principles of comparative advantage to promote industries with dynamic potential. For example:
Rather than accepting some predefined place in a world divided on the basis of 'comparative advantage', such states seek to create 'competitive advantages.' (Pempel, 1999, p. 139) The arguments here are not always clear, but broadly the account seems to run along the following lines. In the orthodox trade theory account comparative advantage evolves smoothly as economies grow: accumulation of capital leads to changing relative advantage and trade specialisation patterns evolve to reflect this (e.g. Balassa, 1979) . Growth determines trade structure, rather than vice versa. The developmental state proponents argue that on the ground the picture is quite different. Firms are often reluctant to shift to producing more advanced, capital-intensive goods as this involves lumpy, risky investment together with the acquisition and mastering of unfamiliar technologies. Standard textbook Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory assumes common global access to technology, 4 but the developmental state denies that technology is freely available or that once acquired firms can immediately use it at best practice levels. In the classic accounts of Korea and Taiwan, firms had to be encouraged and cajoled through policy measures into shifting to new products and industries (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990) . Socialisation of the risks involved through state support and the nature of developmental finance is therefore crucial in the up-grading process.
An alternative -but not mutually-exclusive -approach presupposes multiple equilibria in comparative advantage. For example, Ros (2001) models an economy which produces two tradable goods, one more capital-intensive than the other, and a non-tradable input good which has increasing returns to scale (this might, for example, be infrastructure). Assume too that the capital-intensive tradable uses the input good more intensively. Specialisation in the capital-intensive good would lead to higher capital accumulation and incomes over the long term. Under certain conditions promotion of the capital-intensive good can lead to specialisation in it and thus higher income (increased demand for the non-tradable output reduces its cost further increasing the output of the capital-intensive good). However, this does depend crucially on the conditions for multiple equilibria being present. If factor conditions clearly give the country a relative advantage in the capital-intensive good then it will become specialised in it anyway: industrial policy would therefore be inefficient, although to the naked eye it would appear to be effective because the industry promoted would grow. If the country does not have the factor conditions to specialise in the capital-intensive good then industrial policy cannot 'magic' this into existence: industrial policy would be both inefficient and ineffective. Empirical work on testing this is on-going, but it is far from clear that Latin American countries did have the factor conditions to produce the manufactures they were promoting in the post-war period (e.g. Mahon, 1992) . Note, too, that although the non-tradable sector exhibits both increasing returns to scale and positive externalities (raising the productivity in the tradables industries) this does not of itself create a case for industrial policy (pace much of the developmental state literature); multiple equilibria in comparative advantage is a necessary condition for efficient industrial policy here.
Nevertheless, in the classic cases firms given protection (including subsidies or preferential credit) were expected to export from an early stage and this was a key criterion for continued support (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Amsden, 2001, p. 161) . Exporting provided useful information for firms and provided governments with a good indicator of whether the industry was maturing successfully. How successful this promotion was remains unclear, particularly in the light of the point above in not confusing apparent success with efficiency. Amsden (2001, ch. 9 ) finds evidence of continued growth in promoted industries and points out that since trade liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s there has been little structural change in industrial patterns of these economies (if they were promoting internationally uncompetitive industries one would expect these to decline as protection was reduced) and the leading edge sectors have continued to expand (Amsden, 2001, ch. 9) and Lee (1995) found evidence that industrial policy had altered Korea's pattern of trade specialisation. Pack (2000) , however, found little evidence that industrial policy had had much effect on the industrial structure and trade specialisation of Korea. Elsewhere the history of such policies is mixed, to say the least. Brazil and Mexico followed similar policies before the 1982 debt crisis but with much weaker control mechanisms (Abreu et al, 2000; Cárdenas, 2000) . Colombia had some success in developing industrial capacity for subsequent manufactures exporting (Ocampo and Tovar, 2000) , although the protected trade regime may have inhibited Colombia's ability to capitalise on export growth in the 1970s (Morawetz, 1981) . Although in many ways a prototype liberalised economy under Pinochet, Chile also saw a variety of subtle state measures to support particular industries that may have played a catalytic role in their export success (Kurtz, 2001 ).
The policies of selective seclusion also applied to inward direct investment, particularly to ensure the development of indigenous technological capacity. Thus Chang (1998, p.106 ) characterises the post-war regimes in Korea and Taiwan in the following way:
First, there were measures to ensure the 'right' kind of technologies were acquired in the 'right' terms. The technology that was to be brought in by the investing TNC was carefully screened to ensure that it was not overly obsolete and that local subsidiaries were not subject to excessive royalties. Second, there were measures to maximize technology spillovers. Investors who were more willing to transfer technologies were selected over those who were not, unless the willing investors were too far behind in terms of technology…. Third, local content requirements were strictly imposed in order to maximize technological spillovers from the TNC presence. Targets for localization were set realistically, however, so that the requirements would not seriously hurt the export competitiveness of the host country.
Similarly Amsden (2001, chs 7-8) emphasises the development of indigenous capacity at the level of individual firms, and (Pempel, 1999, p. 139 ) emphasises developmental states 'most especially, carry through a sustained project of everimproving productivity, technological sophistication and increased world market shares.' Generally these accounts view developmental states as having been successful in this regard. Given the emphasis on the development on indigenous technological capacity, it is surprising that the developmental state literature has paid little attention to the estimates of Alwyn Young, popularised by Paul Krugman (1994) , that found productivity growth in East Asian economies to have been low and most of their economic growth accounted for heavy accumulation of physical and human capital (Young, 1994; . Organising this accumulation is hardly a small matter, and is discussed below. The basis of Young's estimates is not incontrovertible (cf. Felipe, 1999) ; nevertheless, detailed refutation is surely required if they are not to be accepted. A common criticism, that such capital accumulation with low productivity growth would have run into low rates of return, looks much less compelling in the light of evidence precisely of very low marginal returns on investment in East Asian countries before the 1997 crisis.
Bringing Capital Back In
Surprisingly, much of the developmental state literature contains little on what actually drives growth in this country. If rapid technical progress from indigenous technological capability is found wanting as an explanation, we must look instead to capital accumulation.
5 Co-ordination of investment decisions is one of the most powerful arguments for industrial policy (Vartiainen, 1999; cf. Chang, 1994; where there is major interdependence of investment because the expected profitability of one investment project depends on whether or not others are undertaken then the market may lead to sub-optimal levels of investment. State co-ordination of investment can lead to higher levels; Rodrik (1995) in particular argues that this was crucial in achieving rapid growth in Korea and Taiwan. Others have identified a profits-investment-growth nexus in East Asian economies (Akyuz and Gore, 1996; Akyuz et al, 1998; Seguino, 1999 Seguino, /2000 . In (post-) Keynesian terms developmental states were able to maintain the animal spirits of capitalists and ensure that savings out of capitalists' incomes were high. With animal spirits, orthodox economics accounts overlap considerably the heterodox developmental state theorists, emphasising macroeconomic stability (although heterodox accounts stress maintaining aggregate demand more than controlling inflation and budget deficits), relatively low cost of capital goods 6 , a compliant system of industrial relations and a climate of protection of property rights. Developmental state theorists also stress the ability of the state to ensure high investment out of corporate incomes - Singh (1998) contrasts East Asian with Latin America in this respect. The developmental state was extracting rents from other groups -tax payers, household savers, consumers -and allowing firms to capture these provided they invested heavily according to government priorities.
7
(To a limited extent this approach does bring capitalists back in, who have often lurked in the shadows of developmental state theory. The developmental state proponents have often effectively portrayed a timid capitalist class, unable or at least unwilling to undertake risky investment projects and needing a whole set of inducements to get them to do so. It is not surprising that Meredith Woo-Cumings opens by quoting Alexander Hamilton: 'Capital is wayward and timid in lending itself to new undertakings… the State ought to excite the confidence of capitalists.' (WooCumings, 1999, p. 1). This is not a picture of capitalists that neo-classical economists, Austrian economists or Marxists would recognise, perhaps least of all in East Asia.
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Even Keynes notion of animal spirits was intended as a cyclical phenomenon rather than a permanent characteristic of the capitalist class. The post-Keynesian emphasis in Singh (1998) and others on the levels of savings and consumption out of capitalist income does, however, have a theoretical basis).
The policies and institutional framework of developmental states nevertheless may encourage over-accumulation of capital, as Amsden (2001) concedes. Given heavy accumulation of capital and apparently slow rates of technical progress one might expect this to be particularly prevalent in East Asia. Recent evidence points to the magnitude of this. Pomerleano (1998) Thus the boom fuelled by capital inflows in the 1990s was not simply one of speculation and asset price bubbles. The impact on rates of return on capital largely conforms to expectations, as table 2 illustrates. Source: Pomerleano (1998) The problems of profitability in these economies -which is consistent with other evidence on profits in East Asian economies (Mueller and Yurtoglu, 1998; Glen et al, 1999) -is even more apparent if makes allowance for the interest rate, crudely approximating to the internal rate of return, as shown in table 3. Source: Pomerleano (1998) Put into context, these figures do suggest that over-expansion leading to declining profitability is not confined to East Asia, but seen in the major economies too (cf. Brenner, 1998) . Without detailed national accounts data, it is not possible to determine definitively how much of this profit squeeze is due excess expansion leading to rising capital-output ratios (rather than squeezed price-cost margins, real wages rising faster than productivity and higher costs of capital), but available evidence points to this being the leading cause.
It is too early to tell whether this represents merely an episode of over-expansion in East Asia (as Amsden, 2001 argues) or a more systemic shift with the post-1960s phase of rapid accumulation have exhausted much of its potential as one would expect from standard growth theory. If this is the case -and the evidence points to it being a distinct possibility -then the institutional arrangements of the developmental state may no longer be appropriate. The next section argues that globalisation has curtailed the ability of such states to use the policy tools they have hitherto relied upon.
The Impact of Globalisation
Globalisation -here largely referring to the emergence of global product and financial markets and the increased spread and intensity of international production -might be thought to undermine the basis of the developmental state. The standard response from proponents of the developmental state to globalisation trends is to downplay them by reference to sceptical works like Hirst and Thompson (1999) . All too often this takes the form of examining a hyper-globalisation thesis from the business school literature -nation states have no real power now, all countries must converge to the Anglo-Saxon model, etc -and find this wanting (e.g. Weiss, 2000) . Predictably, Weiss (1998, p. 1) starts with a quote from the archetypal hyper-globalist Kenichi Ohmae to use as a straw man. Space precludes a general examination of this argument, which succeeds in downplaying globalisation trends largely by denying their most extreme versions, but see Perraton (2001) , Perraton et al (1997) and Held et al (1999) for more detailed arguments.
A variant of the position accepts globalisation trends to some degree but argues that this will tend to enhance the developmental state. Thus, despite largely accepting the sceptical thesis on globalisation, Linda Weiss (1998, pp. 11 & 13) . argues: 'the ability of nation-states to adapt to internationalization (so-called "globalization") will continue to heighten rather than diminish national differences in state capacity, as well as the advantages of national economic coordination…. So-called "globalization" is not likely to displace state power. If anything it will make it more salient.' The clearest exposition of this argument is Kitson and Michie (1999) who point out that acceptance of the reality globalisation does not logically imply that the market failures industrial policy seeks to address will have diminished. On the contrary, they argue that with larger and more competitive global markets the potential role of the state in enhancing national competitiveness is likely if anything to increase. 9 There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this argument in principle; the main problem with it is that it conflates normative and positive assertions. Specifically, simply because in principle a policy intervention could be beneficial -as trade policy measures related to inward investment by MNCs may well be (e.g. Morrissey and Rai, 1995 ) -this does not mean that the intervention is permitted.
Finally, there is the argument that the developmental state will adapt to changing circumstances modifying its policy tools as it does so (e.g. Weiss, 2000; WooCumings, 1999) . Sometimes this is tempered by a degree of circumspection about the prospects for the developmental state under globalisation (Pempel, 1999) . But simply asserting that state intervention will go on even if its form changes is not good enough. A state that, for example, invested heavily in human capital as a development strategy cannot be considered thereby to be a developmental state. This is to reiterate the point above, in terms of the theory of developmental state the fact that there is state intervention is unexceptional; it is the nature of that intervention that is important.
Broadly speaking, new WTO rules act to limit and, in some cases, prohibit the policy tools that developmental states have traditionally used. In general terms discriminatory policies fall under the ambit of the WTO. Policies to promote investment or exports should be generic rather than industry specific. The exemptions granted to developing countries from these general principles are more tightly circumscribed than under the GATT regime. It is not simply that standard tariff and quota restrictions are contrary to WTO principles, so are more specific measures widely used in the past by developmental states. The basic principle of nondiscrimination militates against targeting of specific firms or instituting measures which discriminate against of foreign firms, at least insofar as this has an impact on trade. (There is some limited basis for policies that discriminate in favour of foreign firms.) Specific subsidies to particular industries or for export promotion are prohibited. These prohibitions on subsidies do not apply to the least developed countries, but once a country graduates from this group these must be eliminated over an eight-year period. Developing countries (other than the least developed) currently have five years to eliminate discriminatory subsidies; this may be extended with WTO agreement but this would require annual review. Where a developing country has become competitive in a product -defined as a global market share of 3.25 per centthen subsidies must be removed over a two year period. Overall these provisions represent a tightening relative to the GATT regime (e.g. Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, ch. 5).
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), notably local content requirements, also fall foul of the WTO principles and WTO dispute panels have found against developing countries in respect of these measures. In principle these measures also fell foul of GATT provisions, but the WTO surveillance and enforcement regime is substantially tougher. Negotiations on TRIMs were amongst the most controversial, with the greatest degree of North-South conflict, during the Uruguay Round of the GATT.
Use of export targets -typically, as we have seen, described as a key instrument in nurturing industries -could potentially fall foul of various provisions, including antidumping. This could also apply if -as seems likely -firms took advantage of protection to charge more in domestic markets than they do for exports.
Much of the focus on WTO provisions has focussed on those for goods, especially manufactures. Nevertheless, the push for services trade liberalisation through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has some potential implications here. Promotion of computer software industries -examined by Evans (1995) would fall foul of these measures. Further, GATS provisions are leading to the liberalisation and opening-up of developing country financial markets (e.g. Mattoo, 2000) . This would change domestic financial systems and act reduce the scope for using domestic financial institutions to target specific industries.
The case of Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) was perhaps the most controversial of all during the Uruguay Round and remains so today; partly as a result, there is considerable leeway for countries in the current provisions (e.g. Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, ch. 8). Nevertheless, this does still place some limits on the traditional use of developmental state measures to acquire technological knowhow for domestic firms; further, stronger protection for multinationals' intellectual property rights can play a significant role in attracting inward investment (Yang and Maskus, 2001) There is a sanguine view, proposed by Amsden and Hikino (2000) , that WTO provisions will have little impact in practice. This centres on Articles VIII and XVIII that provide for countries developing industries under infant industry conditions. Although these measures are time-limited and require demonstration of market failure, this could be seen as an advantage if it forced governments to focus support carefully and ensured it did not become open-ended or persistent. However, since infant industry support requires WTO approval this is much more stringent than before. These provisions cannot simply be invoked willy-nilly by developing countries. In practice, developing countries thus far have not invoked these provisions much, preferring instead to invoke the clauses permitting protection for balance of payments reasons (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, pp. 338-9) . It is questionable whether this will be allowed to persist. Of course the nature of the WTO regime will depend on the evolution of case law and Dispute Panels' rulings. But it is not simply that the formal rules have been tightened; to reiterate, the surveillance and enforcement powers of the WTO are considerably enhanced relative to the GATT regime. In this context it may be significant that in only 8 per cent of cases of disputes brought under the GATT over 1948-94 was a developing country the defendant but this had risen to 37 per cent over 1995-2000 under the WTO regime in the context of a sharp rise in the number of cases brought annually (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 395) .
The point here is that the policy measures used by developmental states for 'selective seclusion' are considerably more limited under WTO rules than they were under the post-war GATT regime. Targeting of specific industries, let alone specific national firms, runs contrary to WTO rules. Although some exemptions are permitted under rules, these are usually time-limited. The disciplinary role of the WTO is also strengthened and this has led to increased action against developing countries.
Trends in globalisation through trade, as well as its institutional framework, also act to reduce the effectiveness of traditional developmental state policy instruments. Increasingly developing countries' comparative advantage in manufacturing is falling in stages of the production process -components and semi-finished manufacturesrather than whole products with 'fragmentation' or 'slicing up' of production processes (Feenstra, 1998; Yeats, 2001) . Such production may be undertaken by MNCs, but is also commonly undertaken by independent developing country firms sub-contracted by developed country firms ('out-sourcing' and the like). This has several consequences. It tends to reduce the appropriateness of policies designed to promote specific industries. Protected markets would be an ineffectual promotion tool for semi-finished goods. On the contrary, a liberalised trade regime would be necessary to import components from the previous stage of the relationship. Subsidies create the danger of ultimate purchasing companies being able to play different production locations off each other for support. The liberalising impact of this trade goes further. Developed country purchasers will liase with local firms -whether MNC subsidiaries or independent companies -to provide expertise in production processes, design, etc. This can be an important source of technology transfer. However, the sourcing developed country firms are likely to insist on fairly strict protection of intellectual property rights. The scope for using trade-related policy measures to bargain for technology rents, to promote technology diffusion throughout the economy or to promote indigenous technology capacity is consequently limited.
In the absence of a global regime for FDI, the same kind of formal institutional pressures for liberalisation do not operate for MNCs in quite the same way as they do for trade. Nevertheless, liberalisation measures remain strong. During the 1990s between 80 and 150 regulatory changes to FDI regimes were introduced annually; the vast majority of these made the regime more liberal (UNCTAD, 1999, ch. 4) . Given the generally liberal regime between developed countries, almost all of these changes are between developing/transitional economies or between them and developed countries. These liberalisation moves are likely to continue with bilateral pressure and pressure from multilateral agencies. Particular mention should be made of the liberalisation measures instituted in crisis-hit East Asian, including Korea, since 1997. 10 Whilst as yet falling short of the wholesale liberalisation of the FDI regime some international agencies desire, these measures have made the inward FDI regimes markedly more liberal in these countries (OECD, 2001) . It should be noted that many liberalisation moves in the 1990s reflected not so much external demands but developing countries' efforts to attract inward FDI: policies towards inward FDI are a significant determinant of their flows to host countries (e.g. Taylor, 2000) . Further, as noted above, many of the measures used to extract rents or technology transfer from MNCs fall under trade-related measures and are therefore covered by WTO regulations, whilst inward investment creates pressures for trade liberalisation. None of this means that all inward FDI in developing countries is footloose and developing countries have lost all bargaining power with MNCs -as developmental state proponents tend to caricature the globalisation argument -but it does mean that the bargaining power has fallen considerably (Chang, 1998) .
The impact of financial openness on East Asian developmental states has already been discussed. The standard view amongst developmental state proponents is that the 1997 crisis resulted not from model itself leading to excess accumulation and moral hazard, but from the abandonment of key elements of the model through financial liberalisation (see esp. Weiss, 1998; Amsden, 2001 and Woo-Cumings, 1999 do suggest that features of the East Asian model may have contributed to the crisis). Financial liberalisation undertaken hastily and without adequate regulatory structures is likely to lead to difficulties, as discussed above. However -and notwithstanding Malaysia's reintroduction of capital controls -this is not the same as believing the national systems of finance can be reconstructed along their earlier lines. Although Taiwan's avoidance of the worst of the 1997 crisis may well be partly explained by its capital controls, it is something of a special case given its current account position. The degree of international financial integration of developmental state economies is now sufficiently high that it is unlikely to be significantly reversed, particularly insofar as these economies wish to continue to attract foreign investment (Brouwer, 1999) . Financial integration makes it increasingly difficult for national authorities to control interest rates or direct credit, and would make such policies increasingly vulnerable to profiteering through arbitrage opportunities. Financial openness meeting the developmental state has already sharply undermined the operations of the developmental state; this is likely to continue.
Beyond Plausible Stories: How Much Capacity in 'State Capacity'?
If the argument of the previous section holds that traditional policy instruments have been undermined by globalisation then the nature of the developmental state becomes crucially important if one is to give credence to the notion that it can adapt and develop new policy instruments. There are two main arguments to this section, one empirical and one conceptual. The empirical argument is that the 1997 East Asian currency crisis has thrown up compelling evidence the key developmental states were less of the 'plan-rational' states (Woo-Cumings, 1999) they have been portrayed as. The conceptual point is that notion of a developmental state is too weak as presently defined to give much guidance; hence, in part, the limited amount of comparative principles this work has generated.
One theme is central to all accounts of the developmental state is that of the 'embedded autonomy' of the bureaucracy. Thus, Bruce Cumings argues that in Korea 'the state's relative autonomy from particularist economic interests, combined with the exclusion of workers and farmers, gives it the capacity to look after the whole in the interest of, but not necessarily at the behest of, certain of the parts.' (Northeast Asian Political Economy, p. 73; quoted in Pempel, 1999, p.173) . Linda Weiss argues:
While all (or most) industrialized states have developed a generalized insulation and embeddedness, only some states have developed these features also in a form and degree of particular benefit to the industrial economy…. Firms rely on governments to establish and nurture conditions essential for capturing world markets and for access to stable markets. Governments, on the other hand, depend on firms to increase wealth by generating jobs and growth. The key difference between this ordinary 'interdependence' and systems of GI ['governed interdependence'] is that in the latter, mutual dependence is given far greater formal recognition through opportunities for institutionalised cooperation, and therefore 'governed'. Rather than leaving mutual dependence relations to chance, the state takes a proactive role, drawing business into a negotiating relationship in order to further its developmental projects…. Policies for this or that industry, sector or technology are not simply imposed by bureaucrats or politicians, but are the result of regular and extensive consultation and coordination with the private sector. (Weiss, 1998, pp. 36-9) Peter Evans similarly describes developmental states as exhibiting the following characteristics:
Highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term careers rewards create commitment and a sense of corporate coherence. Corporate coherence gives these apparatuses a certain kind of 'autonomy.' They are not, however, insulated from society…. To the contrary, they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies. Either side of the combination by itself would not work. A state that was only autonomous by itself would not work. A state that was only autonomous would lack both sources of intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralized private implementation. Dense connecting networks without a robust internal structure would leave the state incapable of resolving 'collective action' problems, of transcending the individual interests of its private counterparts. Only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together can a state be called developmental. (Evans, 1995, p. 12) As such, Evans (1998) recommends bureaucratic reform as a prerequisite for successful development.
Related to this, on the specific issue of corruption, authorities are agreed that it was low in developmental states. Adrian Leftwich claims that: 'developmental states have generally been relatively non-corrupt and developmentally determined in contrast with the pervasive corruption from top to bottom in so many developing societies.' (Leftwich, 1995, p. 407, emphasis in original) . Linda Weiss acknowledges the existence of corruption in these states but argues: 'The issue is not whether instances of clientalism or interest-group politics are absolutely ruled out, but instead whether such instances are isolated rather than the rule, especially in the sector of value-added tradables' (Weiss, 1998, p. 39) . Alice Amsden argues that corruption had little if anything to do with financial crises:
Within the jurisdiction controlled by a reciprocal control mechanism, however, corruption was arguably minimized…. Nor was corruption evident patently evident in times of great financial instability, as one would expect if it was of fundamental importance. The foreign debt crises that shook Latin America starting in 1982 and East Asia starting in 1997 were caused by the developmental state's tendencies to overexpand. Latin America's protracted stagnation probably owed more to the developmental state's failures to create a new "leading sector" than to its corrupt practices. (Amsden, 2001, p. 11) .
The aftermath of the East Asian crisis raises questions of how accurate this picture really was. Kang (2002) finds that the Korean bureaucracy was nowhere near as autonomous from political processes or businesses as portrayed in the developmental state accounts. Developmental priorities and policies were dictated and changed by political masters, strongly limiting the discretion of developmental bureaucracies. The view of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) or the Ministry of Trade and Industry did not simply determine development strategy. The chaebol lobbied and bribed to get access to the rents from preferential credit. The industrial priorities often reflected the chosen evolution of the chaebol themselves. This led to over-expansion in key industries leading to the over-capacity that became all too evident after the 1997 crisis. Nor was the state able to orchestrate orderly reductions in capacity by different firms -identified as a key market failure the developmental state could address. Performance monitoring and enforcement was much less rigorous than the accounts of Amsden and others claim. It could hardly be given the highly indebted nature of the chaebol meant that rigorous enforcement risked bankruptcy. In these sense the contrast between the developmental state and others -the Philippines is the comparative case examined in Kang (2002) , but the point can be generalised -is rather less than the developmental state proponents argue. Kang (2002, ch. 4) argues that the key factor that limited the negative impact of corruption in Korea was the state of 'mutual hostages' with the state: both state and big business were powerful and needed each other's success: large firms exchanged bribes for preferential credit and other support but did use this for productive investment rather than simply profiteering.
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Nor is the substance of this picture exactly news to many scholars. This is perhaps best illustrated by the Korean government's problematic drive to promote heavy and chemical industries in the late 1970s, on the face of it a classic developmental state pursuing policies of up-grading export structure into more dynamic industries. But this was less a case of careful autonomous bureaucratic management than presidential decree:
Economic decision making was short-circuited through the [Planning] Council and the second economic secretary directly to the president, frequently bypassing the EPB and the prime minister's office. As a result, the EPB's formal authority to coordinate economic policy decisions related to heavy industries diminished. The EPB tried to check this trend by subjecting investment projects and proposals to strict feasibility studies. But President Park's personal sanction of major investment projects and his selection of private business people who would undertake them frustrated the EPB's efforts. (Choi, 1993, pp. 35-36) .
The architect of the plan, Oh Won-Chul amassed a fortune of $4.5 million or more and took a bribe of 2.2 million won in 1976 (Kang, 2002, p. 105) . The late 1970s surge of investment led to overheating and deflationary policies in 1980 to address this. Attracting finance was problematic given low rates of return, and represented a transfer from (often small) savers to large businesses. Government policy was openly criticised by the chair of the Federation of Korean Industry which led to the EPB closing itself off from business (Rhee, 1994, ch. 4) . Korean big business produced increasing demands for greater freedom from government policy (Rhee, 1994, ch. 5) . There was conflict amongst the companies over rationalising excess capacity and resistance to government proposals for this, ultimately leading to the burden of adjustment falling on smaller firms. On virtually any grounds this episode runs contrary the developmental state story: it was much a political decision as a technocratic decision by the bureaucracy to initiate the policy; rather than a symbiotic relationship between business and state there were frequent conflicts between the two and the state was unable to achieve key aims over goals such as co-ordinated restructuring.
12 Other examples can be produced (e.g. Kang, 2002, ch. 4) . In Taiwan, by contrast, the developmental state went the other way, limiting its contact and relations with business (Fields, 1995) , so this too is in contrast to deep and symbiotic links between state and business stressed in the developmental state accounts.
To repeat, this account is not intended to deny the key role of the developmental state in the post-war growth of Korea and Taiwan. The existence of corruption, even on a much wider scale than claimed by developmental theorists, does not disprove the developmental character of the Korean state. Even in the presence of corruption, the to optimal amount of government intervention is not typically zero given the market failures facing developing countries (Acemoglu and Veridier, 2000) : tolerating some corruption remains optimal. But where does this leave the theory of the developmental state?
Proponents draw a contrast between developmental states, which aim to increase their resources through promoting development, and predatory states (e.g. Evans, 1995) . But this is too easy: Korea is not Mobutu's Zaire, even if it is not without its predatory aspects. Beyond such very broad contrasts the picture becomes less clear. Linda, Weiss, for example argues that 'state capacity is impossible to define in the abstract… the use and efficacy of particular instruments will vary over time, depending on the phase of development and its associated task: but it does not follow that state capacity must thereby ebb and flow.' (Weiss, 1998, p. 15 & 32) . Her point that state strong capacity in one area, such as industrial policy, does not necessarily imply strong capacity elsewhere (for example in social policy) is well made. Nevertheless, it is problematic to define state capacity in specific terms -in relation to particular policies, pursued by particular ministries with particular tools over a definite periodwhilst simultaneously asserting that the developmental state will be able to adapt successfully to meet new challenges with new policy tools it has devised. Often the developmental state literature switches between very broad comparisons -the Korea versus Zaire example -and very detailed accounts arguing that success (or failure) of developmental states. But there is little on principles in between these extremes. Thus, the developmental state literature is critical of Malaysia and Thailand for not instituting effective developmental state mechanisms and the diversion of state resources into rent-seeking activities (e.g. Booth, 1999) . But Malaysia and Thailand have been amongst the most rapidly growing countries since 1960. The tenor of this literature is to criticise the role of their states, but given the success of these countries this question whether the developmental state is typically necessary for rapid growth.
What determines whether a state is developmental or predatory is also unclear. In some accounts the emphasis here is on the intention of the state elite. Thus we have a claim that unlike Latin America, East Asian states possessed the 'will to develop', partly as a result of the cold war legacy creating: compelling motives for intensive economic mobilization that was unthinkable in the Latin American context. The absence in Latin America of the kind of vulnerability and urgency one finds in East Asia has to do with Latin America having entered modernity much earlier than did Korea and Taiwan, not to mention attaining political independence a century earlier; it also began industrialization much earlier, in the context of protected enclaves. By and large, this process was guided not by state action but by individual entepreneurial initiatives, much as it was elsewhere in the pioneer industrial countries. (Woo-Cumings, 1999, p. 22) In its own terms this is a questionable history of Latin America before the 1930s, let alone during the 1950s. An emphasis on state elites' ideologies is surely insufficient: whilst some were venal and corrupt, others clearly desired development but failed in their endeavours. These accounts also stress external threats as creating a developmental 'urgency', but this too is insufficient: many developing countries faced real or perceived external threats and the Third World is littered with cases where countries wasted resources on military expenditure typically funded by predatory states. As the above quote illustrates, emphasis on motivation and attitudes can be combined with a highly structural account emphasising the historical legacy. The nature of the colonial experience does appear to have had a significant impact on subsequent growth (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Putterman, 2000) , but by definition this is not something developmental states can change. Similarly, the power of landed elites is often seen as preventing the emergence of a developmental state. Historically a strong landed elite has been compatible with a developmental state, as the example of Germany shows (e.g. Byres, 1996) . However, in the post-war period land-abundant developmental states are conspicuous by their absence. This may, though, be due in part to comparative advantage: land-abundant countries would be expected to export manufactures later, at a higher level of income than labour-abundant/land-scarce developing economies (Chenery et al, 1986) . Within the developmental state literature there are differences on the nature of state-society relations: Weiss (1998, ch. 3) emphasises co-operation and downplays the coercive nature of the developmental state, as to a lesser degree does Evans (1995) ; this in contrast to accounts such as Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) . Leftwich (1995) actively emphasises the weakness of civic society and independent organisation of non-state actors and argues that the strengthening of these groups through the development process is a key contradiction for the developmental state. A parallel literature on advanced countries claims the reverse: in the literature on corporatism the organisation of business as stressed as a requirement for effective state-business co-ordination (Soskice, 1999) . Developmental state literature proceeds by detailed case studies emphasising the complex combination of forces at work; typically the underlying growth theory is vague. 13 The strength and quality of the best of these studies is not in question, but the work advances its case by means of telling plausible stories. Without more comparative work the status of the theories cannot be fully tested, nor do we have much idea which many claimed features of the developmental state are crucial and whether all must be present for it to be effective.
To make these points clear two examples, one empirical and the other hypothetical, may be helpful. The empirical example is that of India. Whatever negative legacies there may have been, British colonialism bequeathed independent India an extensive, well qualified bureaucracy and at least some facets of industrial infrastructure. There was a political elite that desired development. In seeking to explain why India failed to produce a developmental state, contributors such as Herring (1999) stress, variously: the democratic need to satisfy demands of the poor as well as other interest groups; the difficulty of effecting policy over such a large population with significant power devolved to states; the continued power of the landed class. In terms of the particular example this is question-begging: other developmental states wereapparently 14 -able to achieve popular legitimacy through growth rather than redistribution and India's economic liberalisation was successfully achieved through decisive centralised political and bureaucratic action. 15 But the more general point here is that such accounts actually tell us very little about the conditions for successful developmental states: if India had not had some or all of these conditions would it have been able to run a developmental state effectively.
The hypothetical example is to ask what policy advice a developmental state theorist should give to, say, an average middle-income country with a bureaucracy that is neither outstanding or irredeemably corrupt. Certainly reform of the bureaucracy is desirable, but few would quibble with that. If the various conditions identified as being key to successful developmental states are not all present should one try anyway or assume that in the absence of all conditions it is likely to lead to inefficiency and unproductive rent-seeking. If the importance of conditions lies somewhere between the all-or-nothing judgement -and the logic of some contributions like Pempel (1999) is to make an all-or-nothing judgement -the more precisely where does it lie?
All social scientific enquiry involves both universal principles and historical specifities (see, particularly, Hodgson, 2001, esp. part IV) . Theorists of the developmental state frequently berate orthodox economists as 'not the articulators of some universally valid scientific principles but the vocalizers of little more than a talismanic chant' (Pempel, 1999, pp.140-1) , purveyors of an 'Anglo-American cold war orthodoxy about economic correctness' (Chalmers Johnson, 1999, p. 34) , who 13 Wades' (1990) study of Taiwan can be exempt from these strictures. 14 I say 'apparently' because the legitimacy of developmental states is typically asserted rather than demonstrated in the accounts of its proponents. Such states' suppression of labour movements suggests a different story. 15 On this see further Abhijit Sharma, 'State Power in a Globalised Economy: Rhetoric versus Reality', paper to presented at the PERC conference.
ignore the ways in which developmental states succeeded by 'getting prices wrong' (Amsden, 1989) . The point here is not to defend orthodox economic critiques of the developmental state, although sympathetic economists like Chang (1994; and Vartiainen (1999) point out that recent developments in economic theory can help explain the success of developmental states. It is implausible to claim that Japan, Korea or Taiwan grew despite these countries' industrial policies or that they would have been even richer without these policies. 16 The point here is a more general one, that theorists of the developmental state have gone too far the other way. The emphasis in this literature is on the particular, the complexities of each individual case. It needs to go beyond this.
Conclusions: Beyond Korea and Taiwan
After the 1997 East Asian currency crisis it is evident that developmental states had seen over-investment leading to rising capital-output ratios and falling profit rates. This may not have caused the currency crisis -the evidence of financial panic is compelling -but it does indicate that the old model is approaching exhaustion. This is in part due to globalisation trends undermining the policy tools these economies had relied upon: trade protection and promotion measures are largely contrary to WTO rules, bargaining over inward FDI is increasingly difficult and financial liberalisation and integration in the context of the developmental state is widely seen as having led to the 1997 crisis.
Developmental state proponents are right to point out that globalisation does not eliminate market failures in development and may well exacerbate some of them. This does not, though, mean that policy interventions can be made successfully. The challenge is to develop more accurate comparative notions of what determines state capacity -the capacity to intervene effectively. The aftermath of the East Asian crisis raises questions about how accurate the characterisation of Korea was anyway. But the priority is to move away from studying Korea and Taiwan. As countries as diverse as Mauritius, South Africa and Turkey come to play a greater role in the world economy, we need more comparative studies of other, in particular, Asian and Latin American states to draw out more general principles.
